

Kaw 3.2.1

During 1984, the Security Committee concentrated additional effort on the **problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence information.** The **pernicious** effect upon the national security of the publication of such disclosures is increasingly serious.

An Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center has been established in the Security Committee and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has detailed a senior officer to supervise it. The Center will compile automated data on classified leaks, analyze cases for **possible** patterns of disclosure, provide the Intelligence Community with current information and try to expedite investigations to determine the inside sources of unauthorized disclosures.

The Center recorded more than 90 publications of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence in 1984.

The nature and extent of the problem are further illustrated by the Security Committee's recently published two-volume Survey of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Intelligence FY 1979 - FY 1983 which found 285 publications of such disclosures in a five-year period. The survey showed that the incidence of such disclosures is increasing, that the number of publications and networks engaged in this practice is increasing, and that the elapsed time between preparation of intelligence reports and their publication in the news media is decreasing. The report has been disseminated to 148 Intelligence Community components.

Other initiatives in this area include proposals for a national mechanism to pre-coordinate public statements that may include or be based upon classified intelligence and reinforced efforts to educate cleared individuals

concerning the hazards of discussing classified information with uncleared persons.

The Security Committee conducted seven seminars for Intelligence Community security officers, intended to ensure better understanding of DCI security policy and procedures and to enhance their common application. Three seminars trained 75 officers in adjudicating personnel security cases involving access to sensitive intelligence data. Three other seminars trained another 75 in physical security policy and applications. The first seminar for security education officers, held late in the year, trained 70 attendees in what cleared personnel need to be told about security, and in how best to do it.

The Security Committee conducted two symposia on possible applications of the behavioral sciences to personnel security. Government employee and contractor, and uniformed military, psychologists, psychiatrists, personnel security specialists and officers with related skills shared their experience and insights with 140 Intelligence Community senior security officers. Symposia results are being evaluated as the basis for projected research efforts.

The Intelligence Community's sole facility for training officers in technical surveillance countermeasures, operated under Security Committee sponsorship, was expanded and re-equipped. More than 200 students completed 337 weeks of instruction in 1984.

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during such periods of inactivity. It was not; ~~It required a~~  
~~series of disclosures to bring the issue to the surface for a time~~

methods and product together in one records system.

and to perform pattern and trend analysis, resulted in 1984 in the establishment of the Unauthorized Disclosures Analysis Center in SECOM. ~~xxx~~

concept *was given impetus in October*  
The unit ~~came to fruition in~~ *loan of* 1984, with the assignment  
a Supervisory Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  
as Chief of the Center. He is assisted by one secretary and a  
part-time contract consultant.

INSERT HERE THE WORK TO DATE OF THE  
CENTER, ETC.

Include

~~xxEfforts to establish the un authorized disclosure reporting~~  
~~xx~~

Efforts to consolidate the unauthorized disclosure reporting  
in an automated database, capable of producing a range of analytical  
and management reporting, has been plagued by technical and procure-  
ment problems. It is anticipated the system will be on-line/by <sup>on a trial basis</sup>  
the end of the first quarter, 1985. A ~~Following operation~~  
~~xx~~  
~~xx~~  
~~xx~~

SECRET

## OFFICE

## ACTION

## ACTION OFFICER

## STATUS

Deputy Director, ICS

- During phase B of NWMP process ensure that all potential survivability initiatives which can be undertaken in near and far terms are surfaced by PMs and a cross-program analysis is conducted for review by Senior Review Board. Strategy for funding survivability initiatives should be developed by SRB for review by SECDEF and DCI, with coordination by OSD (C<sup>3</sup> I).

PPS

Draft guidance for Defense and NFIP Programs being prepared for SRB review and issuance to Program Managers.

- Establish small Community task force to develop recommendations on the manpower and personnel issues discussed at the Off-Site Conference, including manpower guidance to NFIP Managers. Explore measures to improve retention incentive programs.

Eloise Page, DD/ICS

- Develop a talking paper to enable the DCI/DDCI to initiate discussions with the SECDEF/D/SECDEF on personnel issues and policies addressed at the Off-Site Conference. Such topics are appropriate for the weekly DCI/SECDEF breakfast sessions.

Eloise Page, DD/ICS

Chairman, SECOM

- NFIB members designate focal points for reporting leak data to SECOM.
- Augment SECOM with additional resources.

Focal points have been identified and guidance provided by SECOM. Actual procedure in check-out phase.

Computer received; FBI representative on board as of mid-1984. Additional resources have been requested in FY 1986 budget.

Bob: Would like a paragraph on status, accomplishments, etc. by noon tomorrow, if possible (5/24) T. Banks

SECRET

Classification (when filled in)

**UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE**

(Use reverse if additional space is needed or for comments)

- (1) Medium \_\_\_\_\_  
(2) Date (DD/MM/YR) \_\_\_\_\_  
(3) Title/Headline \_\_\_\_\_  
(4) Byline (LN) \_\_\_\_\_ (FN/MI) \_\_\_\_\_  
(5) 2nd Byline (LN) \_\_\_\_\_ (FN/MI) \_\_\_\_\_  
(6) Information attributed to \_\_\_\_\_

(7) Also Appeared \_\_\_\_\_

(8) Classified Intelligence Disclosure (Quote or mark on attached copy) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Source Document or Briefing**

- (9) Producing Agency \_\_\_\_\_ (10) Classification \_\_\_\_\_  
(11) No. \_\_\_\_\_ (12) Source Date (DD/MM/YR) \_\_\_\_\_  
(13) Title \_\_\_\_\_  
(14) Quantity Disseminated \_\_\_\_\_ (15) Recipients \_\_\_\_\_  
(16) Country or Region \_\_\_\_\_ (17) Functional \_\_\_\_\_  
(18) Originator(s) of Intelligence \_\_\_\_\_  
(19) Recommend Coordination With \_\_\_\_\_

**Initial Damage Assessment**

- (20) ☐ Grave ☐ Serious ☐ Moderate ☐ Minimal ☐ Unknown  
(Check as many below as applicable)  
(21) ☐ Similar or related disclosure known to have appeared previously  
(22) ☐ Reveals sources and methods: ☐ HUMINT; ☐ COMINT; ☐ IMAGERY;  
☐ ELINT; ☐ FISINT; ☐ FGI; ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_  
(23) ☐ Compromises identity of intelligence personnel/human assets  
(24) ☐ Reveals product/analytical findings/estimates  
(25) ☐ Reveals U.S. Intelligence technology levels (strengths/weaknesses)  
(26) ☐ Reveals U.S. Intelligence interest in or extent of knowledge of a foreign situation  
(27) ☐ Reveals success/failure of an opposition deception operation  
(28) ☐ Alerts opposition to need for (greater) countermeasures  
(29) ☐ Impairs U.S. negotiating posture  
(30) ☐ Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Investigative Status**

- (31) ☐ None; ☐ Opened (pending); ☐ Closed (resolved); ☐ Closed (unresolved)  
(32) ☐ Referred to DOJ/FBI (DD/MM/YR) \_\_\_\_\_. DOJ/FBI Status: \_\_\_\_\_  
(33) ☐ None; ☐ Opened (pending); ☐ Closed (resolved); ☐ Closed (unresolved)

Submitted by \_\_\_\_\_ Agency \_\_\_\_\_  
Report Date (DD/MM/YR) \_\_\_\_\_ CL BY \_\_\_\_\_  
Report No. \_\_\_\_\_ - 8 \_\_\_\_\_ DECL OADR \_\_\_\_\_

Classification (when filled in)

## INSTRUCTIONS

Classification: Execution of this form constitutes confirmation of the classified intelligence disclosure reported. It should receive a classification commensurate with that of the disclosed intelligence. Minimum classification is CONFIDENTIAL when filled in.

The purpose of this form is to facilitate the gathering of data on unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence published or broadcast by the media. The data will be computerized for production of reports and for analytical purposes.

It is essential that forms identify specifically what classified intelligence was disclosed; classification level of the disclosed intelligence and why it is considered classified (identity of classified document or briefing from which the information appears to have been derived or citation of applicable provision of a classification guide or program manual, etc.)

The proper execution of the form will expedite data input to the computer. Fragmentary data with a "see attached clipping" notation does not permit data input without on-site analysis or referral back to the submitter. Classified data contained in the clipping needs to be highlighted. The information can best be analyzed by the submitter, who knows what is classified about the published information.

- (1) Include sufficient bibliographic information to permit retrieval of the disclosure. The medium is the specific broadcast, telecast, newspaper, magazine, book, etc., which reported the information. Identify the medium by name e.g., The New York Times, CBS Evening News, etc.
- (2) Date of publication of the medium in which this specific disclosure appeared.
- (3) Headline or title of article containing the disclosure.
- (4 - 5) Identity of writer or presenter of material containing the disclosure.
- (6) Note the phrases used by the medium to attribute the source of the disclosure.
- (7) If known, enter media by name in which the reported disclosure is duplicated.
- (8) Cite classified intelligence disclosure and/or attach a marked copy of the reported item. Clearly highlight what is classified and level of classification.
- (9 - 13) Identify the source document, briefing or other source from which the disclosure appears to be drawn.
- (14) Indicate quantity of source document disseminated or number of persons briefed.
- (15) Describe dissemination in terms ranging from broad, i.e., "standard NID distribution," to individual agencies, if known. If available, attach a dissemination list.
- (16) Enter country or geographic dimension(s): AF = Africa, including Egypt; AS = South Asia, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and nations west of Burma; CA = Central America and the Caribbean including Mexico; CN = Canada; EE = Eastern Europe, basically incorporating the Warsaw Pact nations; ME = Middle East, incorporating Iran and Iraq west to the Mediterranean; NA = North Asia, incorporating China, Korea and Japan; SA = South America; SE = Southeast Asia, including Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Kampuchea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia; SP = South Pacific, including New Zealand and Australia; SV = USSR; US = United States; WE = Western Europe, including Great Britain and Ireland.
- (17) Enter functional dimension(s): COR = Corruption in foreign governments; CVA = Covert Action (US and allies); DPR = Diplomatic Relations and inter-government activities, including UN; E&F = Economics and Financial; INS = Insurgency; INT = US and allied intelligence activities; IPA = Political action, internal to foreign countries; MLA = Military action; MSA = Military sales and aid; NAR = International narcotics traffic; OIO = Opposition intelligence operation; PER = Personalities; SAT = Science & Technology; SUP = Suppression and human rights denial; TEC = Tech Transfer; TER = Terrorism; WEA = Weapons.
- (18) Identify the Agency which originated the classified intelligence if different than the agency which produced the document from which the disclosure was made.
- (19) List other organizations which may have interest in disclosure.
- (20 - 30) Initial assessment of damage resulting from unauthorized disclosure; check as many as applicable. If (21), if known indicate bibliographic information on reverse or attach.
- (31 - 33) Indicate status; update as necessary by revised form or secure voice communication.

Submitting information: Include name of submitter, agency, and your report number: (Submitting agency identity number) -- (submitting agency's sequential number) -- year.

COMMENTS:

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**COMMENTS:**